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Critic 63.2 
Escaping the Prison of Singularity: The Behavioral 
Axis of the Narrative Transaction 
Marshall Gregory 
I 
MATIHEW ARNOLD'S ELEGIAC LYRIC "TO MARGUERITE-
Continued" laments the deep loneliness of any human life imprisoned in 
singularity. I say "singularity" because I mean not merely the kind of 
isolation that wounds us because we see it as an abnormality but also the kind 
of isolation that wounds us even more deeply because we have come to see 
it as the norm. Arnold stands on its head John Donne's famous metaphorical 
claim that "no man is an island" and asserts that in the modern world each 
of us is more deeply pained by the injury of singularity because we can 
remember a time-or at least we can construct visions of a time-when we 
were connected with others like present-day islands that once formed a 
single continent. Singularity has diminished us modern human beings, 
Arnold suggests, and he plaintively inquires of these individual islands, 
[Who] bade betwixt their shores to be 
The unplumbed, salt, estranging sea[?] 
Arnold's poem does not argue that singularity is a deep human deprivation. 
He simply describes it as such, leaving the truth of the description to be 
decided by the reader's own intuitive and presumably deep assent. Arnold 
recognizes profoundly that we require social reciprocity and, ultimately, 
love, not merely because these are useful to us but because our nature itself 
is stunted, thwarted, and impoverished in their absence. In other words, we 
need each other not just for utilitarian reasons but also for existential and 
ethical reasons: existential because the potentialities of full human existence 
are realizable only in society, not in singularity, and ethical because the 
quality and the moral status oflife depend mostly on the quality and range 
of options both imaginable and real within the social contexts that form us. 
In the absence of constant interactions with others, we live in a prison of 
singularity where even our individuality loses its meaning. 
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Few human activities investigate the poverty or richness of human life or 
describe the mechanisms of ethical formation as fully and particularly as 
narratives do. In the development of our intellectual views and ethical 
stances, we cannot do without the guidance and examples of first-hand 
friends, acquaintances, and loved ones, but neither can we do without the 
second-hand guidance and examples of narrative friends and loved ones, for 
these latter supplement our need for sociability and help us fill out the 
education about the ways and means of being human that we receive from 
first-hand acquaintances. It would be wise of all of us who spend our lives 
construing theories about language and literature to remind ourselves-
daily at least-about the roots of our deep and inextinguishable need for 
narrative. 
Thus, to begin this essay, I am going to present a story that children's 
book author Maurice Sendak related in his Zena Sutherland lecture in 1983. 
Sendak's lecture is about the creative process, and in the course of it he tells 
a story about how a real-life girl named Rosie ended up in one of his books 
(which was eventually made into a Broadway play). Sendak was sixteen in 
1945, when he observed Rosie, who was then eight or nine: 
[M]y great pleasure was to sit at the window and draw Rosie. I 
have no idea why I did it. We lived in a two-family house; we were 
on the top floor, and you could look right down, and she would 
come out every day, all dressed up like the whore of Babylon, her 
mother's garments, hats, pearls, drippingjewelry, all Felliniesque. 
You could see her ordering the day, sitting on the stoop, 
looking for victims .... Rosie had no opportunity but to make do 
with what she had, which was a small street of rather boring 
children, and I would watch her be Fellini. Sometimes she failed, 
sometimes she was immensely successful, but she'd sit there and 
plot, like a great black widow spider, and then the kids would 
come around because, although they resented the immense 
power she had over them, there was no one else to turn to. She'd 
seen the movies, she'd listened to the radio-there was no 
television at that point, or very few people had television sets-
so they depended entirely on her for feedback. 
Typical of Rosie's stories, when she was having trouble 
holding the kids' attention, [was] ... a very fateful line that always 
worked; it worked with me, too,just watching her. She would say, 
"Did you hear who died?" Well ... fantastic line [Sendak's 
ellipsis]. You knew she was going to lie, but it just made no 
difference, because it was the way she said it. Her timing was 
perfect, her coolness, her aloofness-every head would turn, and 
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we were all sucked in, and there was I, dizzy with pencil, writing 
out whatever she was about to say. 
She did this on a number of occasions, but my favorite "Did 
you hear who died" day was about her grandmother; she said her 
grandmother died, and then, of course, came a great chorus of 
"Oh, she did not; you're crazy." She let that pass; she never 
picked fights, she would just wait for them to stop, and then she 
said, "She died. She died early in the dawn." She was very 
dramatic. ... Well, it seems that one dawn, Grandma got up 
... and began to beat a mattress in the window. She did this with 
such vim and vigor that she lost her breath. She choked, and she 
fell down onto the floor. Rosie heard the thud; no one else did. 
She ran up to the attic room, and there was her grandmother 
struggling for breath, deep purple. She leaped onto the prone 
body and gave her grandmother the kiss oflife. 
The kids all said, "What? The kiss oflife?" ... Rosie gave it to 
her grandmother any number of times. (At this point, Rosie 
hurled down one of her friends on the stoop and gave her the kiss 
oflife to show them what it was like.) The kiss oflife failed. It 
failed. And to avoid upsetting her mother and father, she didn't 
tell them; she just called the mortuary. Apparently, her parents 
never found out their mother died. And Rosie's grandmother 
was put in a kind of shopping bag, as Rosie described it, and taken 
away. 
The story was fantastic. I stopped writing in the middle of it, 
because it was so vivid. At that moment-and I know this is true 
because I saw it-her grandmother came down the street with two 
enormous shopping bags, two great big puffy slippers on her feet. 
She was a ferocious, scowling woman who spoke no English. I 
don't know if she liked anyone or not, because I never under-
stood her, but as she came to the stoop, there was Rosie with her 
friends seated right in the middle. Her grandmother said some 
tough, guttural thing, and, like the Red Sea, the kids just parted; 
they didn't fight her for a second. She went stomping up the 
stoop and she slammed the front door and she went stomping 
upstairs up to the attic, and the kids closed in and they said, "Tell 
us again, Rosie." (16-18) 
There you have it: the knockout punch, the slam dunk. Fact scores zero, 
narrative scores one hundred. The need for the story is stronger than the 
presence of the fact. Postmodernism's skepticism about narrative's power is 
made doubtful. 
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Well, not really. Postmodernists who chide some kinds of narratives for 
supporting objectionable social values and some readers for being too 
credulous are not going to roll over and give up the ghost. And they 
shouldn't; they have much to tell us that is important and interesting. But 
I wanted to repeat Sendak's story to make my own prejudices on this issue 
clear. In my view, narrative has the capacity to vivify life, the power to hold 
out a vision of things as they might be, and the powerto suggest that we might 
want to value certain fictions over certain facts on the simple grounds that 
often the fiction that hasn't happened seems to hold more truth, somehow, than the 
fact that has happened. Insofar as anyone agrees with these views, he or she is 
also agreeing that fictions possess immense potential for forming and 
shaping ethos, or character, for important dimensions of ethos are embed-
ded in whatever capacities we might have for leading a life more or less vivid, 
for seeing alternative versions of how things might be, and for believing in 
the value of truths that go beyond empirical experience. 
My general topic, which I explore in the first section of this essay, deals 
with the ethically formative power of story: not its power to form our views 
about the stock market or building codes or gangster life but its power to 
meet our needs for sociability by educating us about the nature of the lives 
of the other people on whom our own sense of validated existence depends. 
In the second section of my essay, I narrow my focus to deal specifically with 
the educational power of narrative role-modeling. My thesis is that the 
narrative role-modeling of specific behaviors constitutes, first, an important 
form of education about discrete behaviors that can help us meet life's 
specific circumstances and, second, an important way to acquire a theory of 
life. 
One of the most important educational realizations we ever come to as 
human beings is that knowledge and experience are not synonymous-
though experience is certainly not irrelevant to knowledge. Experience 
yields only data, but the experience of data as data does not yield obvious 
knowledge any more than experiencing sand on the beach yields the 
knowledge that sand and silicone are the same substance, describable in 
terms of its specific molecules. Knowledge emerges only as the product of 
theories that organize and interpret the data. Knowledge, in other words, 
is always conceptual. 
Experience counts, but primarily as a way of getting our attention, of 
focusing our interests. If we never get past experience by making an 
inference or constructing a generalization or postulating a law, then 
experience can teach us nothing. Never rising to the level of conceptualization 
means that future experience will lie before us in an unbroken string of ad 
hoc occurrences-life's famous "one damn thing after another"-each of 
which will be real and really experienced but mute as to its significance and 
meaning. As Plato was fond of pointing out, we can have knowledge of things 
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we have never experienced, such as perfect triangularity or perfect justice, 
and we can have much experience of things about which we have little or no 
knowledge, such as listening to a language we don't know or tasting a new 
kind offood with spices in it that we cannot identify. In the first case, the 
knowledge is real even though it has no experiential counterpart-real in 
at least the same sense that crescent wrenches and algebra are real: capable 
of being employed to measurable and evaluative effects in the world of both 
thought and matter-and in the second case, the experience is real even 
though it is based on no knowledge of what we are experiencing. 
Literature, especially narrative, is humankind's most important, most 
comprehensive, and certainly most successful method of presenting before 
us, for our contemplation, our delight, and, ultimately, our knowledge, 
forms and images of conceptual knowledge that may be based on experience 
but that go beyond experience in precisely the way that made Aristotle claim 
that poetry is more philosophical than history. Fiction gives us the what-
never-happened in order that we may make sense of the what-really-
happened or what-really-is-happening. Hilary Putnam, I am happy to 
report, agrees with me. (This may be the only time in my life that I have ever 
been corroborated by a math professor.) Literature, especially the novel, he 
says, gives us "knowledge of a possibility. It is conceptual knowledge .... 
Thinking of a hypothesis that one had not considered before is conceptual 
discovery .... [And such knowledge] is practical knowledge of how to live" 
(90-91). 
Such claims do not go uncontested today. The skepticism generated by 
postmodern critics has had the salutary effect of making some of us 
dedicated to a life and a love ofliterature less lazy and less complacent about 
the value of and the justifications for what we do and what we value. But 
though this skepticism has done me good, it has not made me change my 
mind. In fact, one of the best things postmodern criticism has done for me 
is to force me to sharpen and deepen my own understanding of why I should 
not change my mind about the value I place on literary knowledge: 
knowledge of the unseen but possible, knowledge of the concepts that help 
us all understand the data of our lives. Author Lloyd Alexander suggests that 
narrative is only illusion and concedes that illusion "is what appears to be 
real, but in actuality does not exist. Illusion seems." "Yet," Alexander 
continues, "[illusion] can seem to be more real than reality. I t only pretends 
to be true, but it can show facets of truth we never saw before. Illusion, in 
this sense, is an illumination. It reveals, it does not obscure .... Without a 
life of its own, it creates a life for us; that is, it lets us create one for ourselves." 
(35) 
Before I can simply continue making my case about literature's general 
educational power and narrative role-modeling as a special instance of it, I 
must at least acknowledge the strong challenges to my views. These 
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challenges come from many sources and are not unimportant. I will not take 
time and space here to analyze them, but I have no wish to pretend that the 
opposition has no voice of its own. 
One challenge comes from the notion of the "resisting reader," the 
view-ably advanced, for example, by Judith Fetterley-that readers should 
put up their guard when reading literature lest they be taken in by 
patriarchal (or other objectionable) values before they even know they have 
been co-opted. Another challenge comes from those who fear censorship so 
much that they advance the absurd position that since literature is "only 
words," and that since real harm can come only from "sticks and stones," we 
should all stop being so uptight about gangsta rap and pornography and 
Harlequin romances and worry more about poverty and guns (as if we had 
to give up one worry to have another). 
Another challenge comes from those who claim that literature 'Just 
reflects reality" but does not invent it or influence it. This is the typical 
retreat of gangsta rap singers and their unlikely bedfellows, television 
network executives and Philip Sidney. The implication here, of course, is 
that if fiction merely portrays ideals or reflects reality, then it can neither 
lead nor mislead (as if duplicating a thing by reflecting it doesn't intensify 
its effects). 
A third challenge comes from the disciples of Jacques Derrida who 
started claiming in the seventies-and many ofthem have not given up yet-
that since language is indeterminate, literature is also indeterminate, and 
that since literature can refer only to words, not to reality, it lacks sufficient 
traction on either experience or knowledge to be educational (a fundamen-
tally trivializing view ofliterature that turns it into a game capable of being 
played only by an educated elite). 
Another challenge comes from Roland Barthes and Michel Foucault and 
their followers, who claim that authors have disappeared, that they have been 
folded back into something Foucault calls an "author function," which is 
nothing but a kind of sentient pencil with which the "master narratives" of 
society perpetually rein scribe themselves into positions of political author-
ity, using the unconscious complicity of author-functions as shills for the 
social masters who run society's show. This view maintains that literature is 
educational, but only in the service of whatever power group happens to 
hold the top-dog position. In this view, literature's educational power is 
merely a form of social and political manipulation. 
Yet another challenge comes from the extremist branch of reader-
response theory as articulated, for example, in the early work of David 
Bleich, whose theory takes away all autonomy from literary works and hands 
it over to readers, who remake every text in their own image as they read. If 
the text has no autonomy, it certainly cannot educate. 
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And, finally, another challenge comes from a certain pedagogical 
practice that shows up in some, not all, student-centered classrooms where 
Bleich's brand of reader-response theory encourages students to avoid being 
challenged by literature, on the grounds that literature is just a series of 
prompts for solipsistic rewritings of the self and that pedagogy is a matter 
not of helping students come out of themselves but of giving them the 
"freedom" to clone the world in their own image. 
When advanced and argued responsibly, all of these challenges to a 
traditional faith in literature's ability to educate human beings can show and 
have shown the ways in which this traditional faith needs to be more self-
critical, more self-aware, and less complacent. But even in their very best 
forms, most of these challenges, if taken seriously, cripple the very under-
standing ofliterature's ethical effects that I am eager to defend. 
In the first place, what I mean by "ethical effects" refers to those 
influences that help shape ethos; I do not refer to literature that prescribes 
right and wrong behaviors in programmatic or doctrinaire ways. In the 
second place, although postmodern criticism has understood better than 
traditional humanism the extent to which hollowness, deception, and 
manipulation lie at the heart of many fictional representations, postmodern 
criticism has failed to understand that the potentially pernicious effects of 
these representations cannot be obviated by mere finger wagging, political 
bashing, or claiming that fictional images have no significance beyond 
surface shimmer. Postmodern criticism fails simply to understand how 
much we all need fiction and how little we are ever going to be persuaded to 
view, read, or otherwise consume only the "right" fiction-or to read it in 
the "right" way-by the sanctimonious, scandalized sneers of those who are 
horrified at fiction's complicity with the world's cruelty and oppression. Of 
course, fiction is implicated in the world's cruelty and oppression; it is also 
implicated in the world's generosity, kindness, and nobility. Fiction is as 
large as life and is coextensive with existence itself(all cultures and all human 
beings tell and consume stories), and the really valuable contribution that 
criticism can make to our transactions with fiction is to help us understand 
and evaluate its influence, not to flabbily trivialize or narrowly politicize that 
influence. 
By fiction, I am referring not merely to written, published, mainstream, 
or canonical literature but also to stories in all the different forms that exist: 
stories on television; oral stories in nonliterate cultures; stories in the form 
oflegends, parables, and myths; stories from the Bible and other religious 
texts; stories in the movies; and, of course, stories as told in dramas, novels, 
narrative poems, short fiction, and many historical narratives. My view is 
this: Although literary knowledge would never be enough to educate us in 
all the ways we need educating, it nevertheless addresses certain forms of 
learning sufficiently deeply to justify the view that literary knowledge plays 
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the role of an indispensable supplement to other indispensable kinds of 
education. I do not assume the misguided position that literary effects are 
always benign or automatically ennobling, but I do assert that for all their 
dangers and misdirections, literature's benefits cannot be dispensed with. 
We must have story, especially narratives, to come into our full humanity. 
This is a sweeping but defensible statement, for I think it is undeniable 
that no human being is content to know of life only what he or she 
experiences first-hand, internally, or singularly. Life does not happen only 
within the confines of our inner feelings and thoughts. Like social construc-
tionists, I hold a deep conviction that none of us can become human in the 
absence of other human beings. There is no essential, fully-formed homun-
culus in us that will flower into full development apart from other people 
the wayan acorn will turn into an oak tree whether it grows in an oak forest 
or in the middle of a cornfield. As I have already noted, sociability lies at our 
human core, and stories provide an indispensable means in every culture for 
us to escape the prison of singularity and to know what other people 
experience. Because we are creatures of imagination, we are not content 
either to possess or to live just one life. One life isolated from others is not 
a human life; it is a form of autism. On the other hand, a human life with 
others in it but without stories would hardly be a human life either, certainly 
not a full one and certainly not a kind oflife that anyone reasonably human 
has ever lived. (That there have never been any non-story-telling human 
cultures suggests that becoming human and telling stories are and always 
have been interdependent activities.) Any life deprived of the enrichment 
and sociability achieved by stories, no matter how many real-life people were 
in it, would be a disastrously crippled life, perhaps not even a human life. 
In the words of Mario Vargas Llosa, 
Men are not content with their lot and nearly all-rich or poor, 
brilliant or mediocre, famous or obscure-would like to have a 
life different from the one they lead. To (cunningly) appease this 
appetite, fiction was born. It is written and read to provide 
human beings with lives they're unresigned to not having .... To 
want to be different from the way one is is the human aspiration 
par excellence. Ithas engendered the best and worst in recorded 
history, including works of fiction. 
When we read novels, we aren't only who we are but, in 
addition, we are the bewitched beings into whose midst the novel 
transfers us. The transfer is a metamorphosis-the asphyxiating 
constriction of our lives opens up and we sally forth to be others, to have 
vicarious experiences which fiction converts into our own. A wondrous 
dream, a fantasy incarnate, fiction completes us, mutilated beings 
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burdened with the awful dichotomy of having only one life and 
the ability to desire a thousand .... Fiction is a temporary 
substitute for life. The return to reality is almost a brutal 
impoverishment, corroboration that we are less than we dreamed. 
(40; emphasis added) 
Llosa's sweeping claim, which supports my own sweeping claim that story 
is essential to the possession of our full humanity ("the return to reality is 
almost a brutal impoverishment"), is further supported by the realization 
that every culture, every subculture, every family, every religion, every 
science, and every person is full of stories. Take away story and we lose most 
of what we know about the world. Observe: I do not say take away story and 
we lose experience. Experience, like the poor, we always have with us. But 
experience is a poor teacher by itself. We must go beyond experience, into 
the world of the unseeable-inferences, inductions, generalizations, analo-
gies, metaphor, theories, and interpretation-to acquire knowledge, and 
this taking us into and then beyond experience is precisely what literature does 
most vividly, most comprehensively, and most efficaciously among all forms 
of human learning. Having once taken in a fiction, a hypothesis about the 
what-may-or-could-happen, we are liberated to act in nonprogrammed, 
unpredictable, and creative ways. Experience, either positive or negative, 
may direct our impulses, but to have an impulse is not necessarily to have 
knowledge, not even of the nature of the impulse. I t is only to have an urge. 
(See John Dewey's distinction between "impulsion" and" expression" in Art 
as Experience.) But to have a hypothesis about the world is to have knowledge 
about it, at least presumptive knowledge that liberates us for deeds. Two 
years before the Llosa comment just quoted ,J ohn Barth said in an interview 
that although fiction is only 
imagined reality ... [it] has an objective existence and does work 
in the world. Fiction is made up; and yet, having been dreamed 
into existence by the writer, it does actual work in the world-
witness the novel of Harriet Beecher Stowe to whom, as you know, 
Abraham Lincoln himself, in the midst of our Civil War, said, 
"You are the lady who caused all this." Fiction does work in the 
world. The characters in a novel don't ever take on the kind of 
reality that real people have; but people can be moved and 
changed and touched by them, as by one's friends and intimates. 
(35) 
One of the obvious ways that fiction touches us is by providing models 
that guide us in our responses to life's everyday situations. In a chapter that 
he calls "Literature as Equipment for Living," Kenneth Burke lays down an 
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argument-sketchy but pregnant-that literature, specifically fiction, 
"names" the situations of life to which we must form responses. Burke 
argues that fictions, by representing these situations in all their concrete 
embeddedness, provide us with models for how to face these situations, deal 
with them, understand them, endure them, control them, and so on. He 
writes: 
[T]he main point is this: A work like Madame Bovary (or its homely 
American translation, Babbitt) is the strategic naming of a 
situation. It singles out a pattern of experience that is sufficiently 
representative of our social structure ... for people to "need a 
word for it" and to adopt an attitude toward it .... Art forms like 
"tragedy" or "comedy" or "satire" would be treated as equip-
ments for living, that size up situations in various ways and in 
keeping with correspondingly various attitudes. (296-304) 
The power offiction' s "naming of a situation," we must remember, is not 
the same kind of power that philosophy and science exhibit in their naming 
of situations. Philosophy and science idealize particulars to name situations 
(via laws and hypotheses) at the highest level of generality. Once Isaac 
Newton saw the underlying connection among thrown balls' returning to 
the ground, waterfalls' plunging toward pools, and apples' falling from 
trees, he did what science and philosophy always do: He attempted to 
formulate a general law (of gravity) that explains these particular events 
without any longer referring to them. This is an immensely powerful and, 
in its own way, humanly liberating way of naming situations, but it is not 
fiction's way. 
Fiction never leaves the realm of particularity. Fiction's peculiar power 
resides in its ability to display human actions with such detailed embeddedness 
that auditors feel they are there: there in the world being fictionally 
represented. (Nancy Willard illustrates my meaning with a childhood story: 
"When I was a child, my older sister and I had a game .... It required two 
people: the teller and the listener. The teller's task was to describe a place 
as vividly as possible ... until the listener said, 'Stop. I'm there'" [104].) It 
does not damage my point to concede that fiction's details are artistically 
shaped, organized, and selected. This merely means that fiction's 
embeddedness never was and never will be the "slice of life" that the 
naturalists claimed it was or should be. The philosopher Cora Diamond, 
drawing the phrase "texture of being" from Iris Murdoch, highlights the 
importance ofliterature's representation of the details of people's particular 
behaviors: the way people look at each other, the things they laugh at, the 
way they use body language to express rhetorical and political power, the 
kinds of jokes they tell, the occasions on which they weep or get angry, and 
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so on. These details reveal both what people do and who they are. These are 
just the details that scientists and moral philosophers never get much of a 
handle on and that are the very stock-in-trade of fiction writers. In 
Diamond's words, 
[T]he opening chapters of Anna Karenina-what do they give us 
so much as the texture ofStiva's being? His good-hearted, silly 
smile when he is caught at something shameful, his response to 
the memory of the stupid smile, the failure of his attempt to look 
pathetic and submissive when he goes back to Dolly-what he 
blushes at, what he laughs at, what he gives an ironical smile at, 
what he turns his eyes away from: this is Stiva .... We cannot see 
the moral interest of literature unless we recognize gestures, 
manners, habits, turns of speech, turns of thought, styles offace 
as morally expressive-of an individual or of a people. The 
intelligent description of such things is part of the intelligent, the 
sharp-eyed, description of life, of what matters, makes differ-
ences, in human lives. (162-63) 
In the same vein, Martha Nussbaum asserts in Poetic justice that "an 
especially distinctive feature of the genre [of the novel is] ... its interest in 
the ordinary, in the daily lives and struggles of ordinary men and women" 
(32). While "visiting" the lives of ordinary men and women and making 
literary friends with them, "We are made to attend to their ways of moving 
and talking, the shapes of their bodies, the expressions on their faces" (27). 
Recent brain research by neurophysiologists is beginning to reveal the 
physical processes by which literary imaging in the vicarious imagination 
becomes available to us as brain pictures on which we can model behavior 
or by which we can achieve a deeper and richer understanding of the world. 
This research is in its early stages but is highly suggestive of narratives' power 
to give us models that influence us in exactly the same way that models in real 
life influence us. '''People have always wondered if there are [literal] pictures 
in the brain,' said Dr. Martha Farah, a psychology professor at the 
University of Pennsylvania," and the answer seems to be Yes: "[A]n image 
held in the mind's eye," it turns out, seems to have "physical rather than 
[ merely] ethereal properties" (Blakeslee 1). Stephen Kosslyn, a psychologist 
at Harvard University who is a pioneer researcher in both human visual 
systems and mental imagery, reports that "every visual area that sends 
information upstream through nerve fibers also receives information back 
from that area. Information flows richly in both directions at all times" (7). 
In other words, it appears that although mental imaging cannot occur 
apart from brain activity, such brain activity can and does occur indepen-
dently of direct, physical simulation. Thus, it seems that we can have physical 
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brain-imaging of things that we see only in the vicarious imagination. 
According to this research, mental stimuli activate the physical visual system, 
so that mental images constructed on verbal cues in narratives look to us-
in our brains-just like the mental images we construct from visual cues in 
the material world. "When a person is asked to look at and then to imagine 
an object," reports Farah, "the same brain areas are activated" (Blakeslee 7). 
Imagining an object gives us the same kind of physical mental picture of it 
as looking at the real object gives us. This research promises to be important 
in combating the view that, because literature exists only in words, it can 
never influence real-life conduct or events the way first-hand experience 
can. If literature's words create the same brain-imaging as first-hand 
experience, then literature's effects are susceptible to social, political, 
psychological, and ethical inquiry,just as the effects of everyday experience 
are. According to Kosslyn, 
"[T]he stimulus can be anything: a memory, odor, face, reverie, 
song or question .... Images are based on previously encoded 
representation of shape ... so you look up the videotape in 
associative memory .... When that subsystem is activated, a 
general image ... is mapped out on the screen, or visual buffer, 
in the primary visual cortex." (7) 
And if the subsystem of associative memories can be activated by images 
from the imagination as well as from physical stimulation, then it clearly 
follows that the mind's-eye imagining that we do while reading narratives 
causes us to create the same sort of physically based imaging that we would 
create if the people and events we "see" in a narrative were actually in front 
of our eyes in physical space and real time. 
II 
The second part of my thesis is that narrative role-modeling constitutes 
one powerful way of acquiring a theory oflife. No one can get by without a 
theory oflife, by which I mean, simply, some guiding notions of what goods 
in life are worth pursuing, what evils are potent enough to try to avoid, and 
what operational values get one through the day. We generally think ofa 
theory of life as being earned by reflection, introspection, comparative 
evaluation of other people's styles and means ofliving, and so on. But a 
theory of life does not have to be earned this way, and our everyday 
experience of watching how people act suggests that in fact most of them 
hold only the sketchiest of explicit theories about life. This does not mean 
they lack a theory oflife, for they work hard at pursuing goods and avoiding 
evils, but it does mean that even if they can identify what they want and don't 
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want, they generally cannot offer searching arguments about the grounds of 
their choices. They have a theory oflife, but it is borrowed, implicit, or both. 
The source from which people can and do get their models is other people, 
by imitating the behaviors of other people rather than thinking through the 
values embedded in or underlying those behaviors. Probably even those of 
us who are introspective and reflective are more given than we might predict 
to adopting an embedded and unarticulated theory oflife in this way. But 
for people who are little given to holistic reflections about life, imitating the 
behaviors of role models, some of them fictional, may be a primary, not just 
a supplemental, means of acquiring a theory oflife. 
Sometimes Oscar Wilde's point about life imitating art receives astonish-
ingly vivid proof in everyday experience. Various public figures, for 
example, create certain "looks" that sweep the country in waves. Such was 
true of the Elvis Presley look and the James Dean look in my own youth, and 
each generation can trot out the exemplars from venues of literature, 
entertainment, and sometimes politics, all of which were imitated in life as 
well as art. Van Wyck Brooks, echoing Wilde, once said of Honore de Balzac 
that "the whole tone of French society was altered by Balzac's influence, types 
and characters arising on every hand, in the generation that followed him, 
reproducing in life all the traits that Balzac had conceived in fiction." And 
he goes on to record the credence he attaches to an observation that many 
would find implausible. "It used to be said," says Brooks, "that the women 
of England grew perceptibly taller as a result ofDu Maurier's cartoons; and 
no doubt Du Maurier did spread the fashion of a more erect carriage. Thus 
writers and artists, and men of action, too, when they use words and phrases, 
play upon us and mold us to their wills" (378-79). Even in passages not 
specifically detailed, literary imaging can provide such a stimulus to 
readerly imagining that the latter fills out the empty places in the former. 
And the content both of the literary descriptions and ofthe readerly filling-
out is not limited to ways of thinking, feeling, and judging but includes 
specific behaviors such as smiling in certain ways, using certain tones of 
voice, and moving one's body in certain ways. Northrop Frye says that "the 
end of literary teaching is not simply the admiration of literature; it's 
something more like the transfer of imaginative energy from literature to the 
student" (129). 
Many of our particular behaviors are based on role models from 
narratives that we have stored in our memories. Once stored, our subsequent 
choices of modeled behaviors may seem automatic, the way that native 
speakers of a language display so easily, for example, the results of an 
extremely complicated training in language protocols without having to 
think about the content of the protocols themselves or the criteria by which 
one protocol is chosen over another; the speaker may not even be aware of 
choosing at all and may never be aware of the cognitive energy that was 
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originally invested in the acquisition of the linguistic protocols. This 
analogy suggests that what we are doing in these many moments of our lives 
when we base a particular behavior on the role model from a story is 
transferring not only the imaginative energy ofliterature to ourselves but the 
imagined content and forms of life portrayed there as well. The ethical 
significance of this act is enormous: Our ethos becomes what it is because of 
what we do. Choosing actions by taking models and images from literature 
is an important way not just of doing but of being. 
Sometimes, we may take a stance of belligerence or strike a pose of 
dignity; sometimes, we may use a colloquial expression or employ a Brahmin 
inflection; sometimes, we may tap our fingers as a sign of boredom or roll 
our shoulders in evasion of a question; sometimes, we may assert leadership 
in a group or maintain a retiring self-effacement; sometimes, we may sit up 
front in class or sit in the back; sometimes, we may speak to others in varying 
tones of compassion or contempt or love or teasing; sometimes, we men may 
shave our heads or comb our hair over our bald spots; sometimes, women 
may indulge in "big hair," complete with lots of hair spray and tiny bows; 
sometimes, we may express our different group affiliations or merely our 
varying moods by wearing cowboy boots or hiking boots or tasseled loafers; 
sometimes, we may define brave behavior as demanding respect on the street 
or asking the dean for a raise or being willing to kill other human beings in 
wars initiated by our country's leaders. 
Whenever we engage in these or thousands of other behaviors, we often 
do so not because we can articulate the idea that lies behind or justifies the 
behavior but just because we have learned these behaviors from other people 
and can imitate them in circumstances where the role models help us choose 
behaviors that fit the situation. Whenever we choose behaviors this way, the 
chances are good-and this is the point at which this issue becomes pertinent 
to ethical criticism and not just to developmental psychology-that many of 
our models for specific behaviors come not from the behaviors of people we 
have observed in first-hand life but from the behaviors of people we have 
observed in everyone's favorite form of second-hand living: stories. The 
ethical significance of imitating fictional figures from television, movies, 
historical narratives, and literature can carry no less significance than that 
of imitating real-life people. 
In the words of Arthur Danto, a twentieth-century philosopher rework-
ing an ancient metaphor, "[L]iterature [is] a kind of mirror, not simply in 
the sense of rendering up an external reality, but as giving me to myself for 
each self peering into it, showing each of us something inaccessible without 
mirrors, namely that each has an external aspect and what that external 
aspect is" (16). As centers of subjectivity, we think of ourselves as certain 
kinds of men or women, as certain kinds of moral agents, or as sites where 
certain human possibilities intersect, and, in order to acquire a sharpened 
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focus on our roles, we turn to all the logical places where we can find the 
education that will help us acquire that focus. We turn to real-life models and 
personal experience; we seek advice, study history, and look to our peer 
groups or religion for guidance. Frequently and inevitably, however, all of 
us supplement the guidance we receive from peer groups or self-help books 
or art or friends or mentors by turning to specific narrative exemplars whose 
narrated lives invite us to identify with them. 
The ethical models offered to us by narratives, especially literature, carry 
atleast four advantages as role models that we may find difficult to duplicate 
with many real-life models. First, we often possess a degree of intimacy with 
literary models that is sometimes difficult to achieve with more than a few 
real-life acquaintances. Not many of our real-life colleagues or neighbors, 
for example, present themselves to us as vividly or offer us such intimate 
knowledge of their interior lives as do I van Ilych, Elizabeth Bennett, or even 
the poetic voices used by John Milton in "Lycidas" or by Wordsworth in The 
Prelude. Second, literary models may offer us guidance that is simply more 
understandable because we see all or most of the surrounding context that 
explains the relevance of the model. The best inferences we can draw from 
the b~havior of real-life models are often murky because the behavior of 
other people is not easily understood unless we can see the interior context 
of motives, feelings, personal history, and attitudes that inform their 
behavior. In the absence of knowledge about such context, the behavior of 
real-life models often seems confusing, inconsistent, or disguised. Third, in 
fictions we are given one kind of information that is crucial to our everyday, 
real-life activities but that everyday conventions usually deny to us. Fictions 
offer us direct access to other people's minds, and this kind of information 
is indispensable to all of us in learning how to make reliable inferences about 
the states of people's minds in real life . Even if the minds are fictional, fiction 
gives direct access to people's self-talk, the kinds of thoughts, emotions, 
motivations, and attitudes that people refer to as they choose their actions. 
Fourth, because of the relative absence of self-interest in our relations with 
narrative role models, narrative acquaintances offer us role models with 
whom we can identify both intimately and intensely, but with whom we are 
sufficiently distant that we can, despite our intimacy, think about them more 
reflectively, more objectively, and potentially more generously than we can 
about role models in real life. Real-life acquaintances and friends who might 
serve us as models also serve as potential sources of emotional entanglement 
that make it difficult for us to think clearly. 
Wilde's quip about life imitating art is frequently cited as nothing but a 
bon mot, but it is actually a well-developed view so pertinent to the present 
topic and so fresh when looked at in its larger context that it is worth 
resurrecting one more time as a fitting conclusion to this section of my 
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position. What Wilde offers is not exactly an argument (which, presumably, 
he'd be relieved to hear), but it is a deep insight. According to Wilde, 
[L]ife imitates art far more than art imitates life .... And it has 
always been so. A great artist invents a type, and life tries to copy 
it, to reproduce it in a popular form, like an enterprising 
publisher. Neither Holbein nor Van Dyck found in England 
what they have given us. They brought their types with them, and 
life with her keen imitative faculty set herself to supply the master 
with models .... As it is with the visible arts, so it is with literature . 
. . . The imagination is essentially creative and always seeks for a 
new form. The boy burglar is simply the inevitable result oflife's 
imitative instinct. He is fact, occupied as fact usually is, with 
trying to reproduce fiction, and what we see in him is repeated 
on an extended scale throughout the whole of life .... The 
nihilist, that strange martyr who has no faith, who goes to the 
stake without enthusiasm, and dies for what he does not believe 
in, is a purely literary product. He was invented by Turgenev, 
and completed by Dostoevski. Robespierre came out of the pages 
of Rousseau as surely as the People's Palace rose out of the debris 
of a novel. Literature always anticipates life. It does not copy it, 
but molds it to its purpose. (680-81) 
III 
Literary accounts in narrative are themselves a rich source of illustra-
tions of Wilde's point and, in addition, offer a narratively reflexive 
assessment of the ethical power of narrative role-modeling. One of the things 
I like about such accounts is that most narrative writers generally pay their 
craft the respect of supposing its influence is real enough to do ill as well as 
good in the world. In this supposition, narrative writers sometimes display 
a tougher cast of mind than those soft-headed humanists who insist on 
arguing that literature can influence us only for good but never for ill (as 
if the bee could ever give us honey without threatening at the same time to 
sting us). 
When Dante and Virgil are in the second ring of the Inferno, where 
carnal sinners are condemned, Dante converses with the two famous lovers, 
Francesca and Paolo, who inform him that they were led to their infidelity 
by reading a vivid description of the illicit love of Lancelot and Guenevere, 
which Francesca and Paolo used, then, as a model for their own illicit love. 
Francesca speaks: 
16 
On a day for dalliance we read the rhyme 
of Lance lot, how love had mastered him. 
We were alone with innocence and dim time. 
Pause after pause that high old story drew 
our eyes together while we blushed and paled; 
but it was one soft passage overthrew 
our caution and our hearts. For when we read 
how her fond smile was kissed by such a lover, 
he who is one with me alive and dead 
breathed on my lips the tremor of his kiss. 
That book and he who wrote it, was a pander. 
That day we read no further. (1165-66) 
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"[O]ne soft passage overthrew / our caution and our hearts": Surely, there 
are few testimonials to literature's power to move readers toward choices of 
character as succinct, direct, and poignant as this one. 
Geoffrey Chaucer's Troilus and Criseyde offers another vivid example of a 
literary account of narrative influence. In Book 2, at that point in the story 
where Criseyde shows great ambivalence about whether to give in to the 
importunities of Pandarus and the impulses of love itself but where her 
ambivalence still leans more heavily toward resistance rather than toward 
relenting, she happens to overhear a song oflove being sung by Antigone, 
her female companion. Antigone's song goes on for fifty lines and is full of 
opinions and descriptions oflove-her lover is "the welle ofworthynesse, 
oftrouthe grownd, mirour of goodlihed, of wit Apollo, stoon of sikernesse, 
of vertu roote, oflust fynder and hed" (112), and so on-but what is being 
modeled in these fifty lines is not just a set of doctrines or opinions about 
love but a particular concrete action: the happiness of the singer. Antigone 
sings because her heart is soaring. What she models are the blessings oflove 
for the beloved. In her fifty-line song, she is to love what Dickens's Sissy Jupe 
is to horses-that is, she speaks from experience, not just from textbook 
knowledge, as Bitzer does-and it is this, Antigone's bliss, that influences 
Criseyde so deeply. Criseyde inquires of Antigone, 
... "Lord, is ther swych blisse among 
Thise loveres?" ... 
"Ye, wis," quod fresshe Antigone the white, 
"For aIle the folk that han or ben on lyve 
Ne konne weI the blisse oflove discryve. 
But every word which that [Criseyde] of [Antigone] herde, 
She gan to prenten in hire herte faste, 
And ay gan love hire lasse for t'agaste 
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Than it dide erst, and synken in hire herte, 
That she wex somewhat able to converte. (112-13) 
Who can deny that the image of a person deliriously happy in love is a model 
more likely to move us in favor oflove than are all the arguments contained 
in a world of syllogisms, and who can deny that some of the most moving 
models oflove are those we know in narratives? It is obvious that romance 
novels, television programs (especially soap operas), and movies replay the 
images of lovers' bliss over and over-we have all seen these images 
thousands and thousands of times-yet the images never lose their fascina-
tion or their ethical power to shape the aspirations of the heart of many of 
their readers and viewers. Pandarus has been arguing Criseyde's self-
interest, but Chaucer knows that modeling bliss will move her heart. 
Few literary models from any time or place have achieved such long-
lasting and practical influence as the Byronic hero. Bertrand Russell, who 
devotes an entire chapter to George Gordon, Lord Byron, in his history of 
Western philosophy, calls the Byronic hero "[t]he aristocratic rebel," whose 
life takes "the form of Titanic cosmic self-assertion [that] ... has inspired a 
long series of revolutionary movements, from the Carbonari after the fall of 
Napoleon to Hitler's coup in 1933" (747). The editors of Byron in the Norton 
Anthology of English Literature concur with Russell's estimation. The Byronic 
figure, according to the Norton Anthology, 
infusing the archrebel in a nonpolitical form with a strong erotic 
interest, embodied the implicit yearning of Byron's time, was 
imitated in life as well as art, and helped shape the intellectual as 
well as the cultural history of the later nineteenth century. 
Although Byronism was largely a fiction, ... the fiction was 
historically more important than the poet in his actual person. 
(480) 
The opening lines of Manfred offer a self-presentation by Manfred that 
fills in the main features of the Byronic hero: 
... [I]n my mind there is 
A power to make [philosophy and science] subject to itself-
But they avail not; I have done men good, 
And I have met with good even among men-
But this avail'd not; I have had my foes, 
And none have baffled, many have fallen before me-
But this avail'd not.-Good, or evil, life, 
Powers, passions, all I see in other beings, 
Have been to me as rain unto the sands, 
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Since that all-nameless hour. I have no dread, 
And feel the curse to have no natural fear, 
Nor fluttering throb, that beats with hopes or wishes, 
Or lurking love of something on the earth. (514-15) 
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Later, when the chamois hunter tries to still Manfred's agitation by advising 
"patience," Manfred retorts, 
Patience and patience! Hence-that word was made 
For brutes of burt hen 
not for birds of prey; 
Preach it to mortals of a dust like thine,-
I am not of thine order. (524) 
Later on, Manfred characterizes himself not as a bird of prey but as a lion: 
I could not tame my nature down ... 
I disdained to mingle with 
A herd, though to be leader-and of wolves. 
The lion is alone, and so am I. (538) 
And the last line of the closet drama is Manfred's defiant and fearless 
assertion: "Old man! 'tis not so difficult to die." The Byronic hero knows that 
he is superior to all other men. He is afflicted with a mostly nameless sense 
of guilt, about which he remains remorseless, and a deep if general sense of 
the futility of things. The characterization is highly self-congratulatory, 
cloyingly melodramatic, intensely egocentric, and intellectually incoherent. 
To any mature person with a farthing's worth of humility, an ell's worth of 
ironic detachment, or one iota's worth of sensitivity toward the relative 
differences in people's situations, the Byronic hero is downright laughable 
in his inflated solipsism and grandiose self-assertion. 
On the other hand, who does not recognize the Byronic hero as one of 
the most imitated models of a certain kind of machismo possessing tremen-
dous cultural and psychological significance in both life and art? Manfred 
is the model (himselfbased largely on the previous model of Milton' s Satan) 
of any number of young men that all of us have known in high school and 
college, perhaps including some of us, who imitated the Byronic hero right 
down to the sneers, the saturnine moods, and the sweeping gestures. If 
cigarettes had been available to Manfred as they were to Rick, played by 
Humphrey Bogart in Casablanca, we know exactly how Manfred would have 
stood, the angle of the shoulders and the tilt of the head, as he lit the cigarette, 
sucked in the smoke, and flipped away the match, looking sardonically 
through a veil of smoke into the eyes of a woman he was about to enfold or 
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an enemy he was about to crush. In literature, this Byronic hero is the model 
for such variations as Heathcliffin Wuthering Heights and Rochester inJane 
Eyre. In popular culture, it is the model for any number of rock stars, such 
as Sting and MickJagger, especially early in their careers. In the movies, it 
is the model for such variations as Marlon Brando's biker-as-antihero in The 
Wild One, Paul Newman's everything-is-meaningless rake in Hud, Clark 
Gable's don't-give-a-damn Civil War profiteer in Gone With the Wind, and 
Ralph Feinnes's I'll-come-back-to-get-you-at-any-costchara cterinthevastly 
popular The English Patient. But these examples are only a few of a massive 
number of examples in popular culture. The longer the issue of ethical role-
modeling from narratives in literature, film, or television is considered, the 
more Wilde seems to deserve credit for being not only insightful but 
positively prescient. 
Perhaps the most incisive and developed account of the influence of 
literary models rendered in any work of literature is Gustave Flaubert's 
narrator's account of how Emma Bovary's delighted and obsessive consump-
tion of sickly romantic novels provided her with models that in their 
shimmering allure prevented her from ever growing up to become a mature 
and ethically sensitive agent. Captivated by the early images of romantic 
extravagance in the novels she read, Emma persistently but futilely, and 
eventually catastrophically, attempts to live the life modeled for her by these 
romantic narratives. Flaubert does not ask us to believe, nor does he himself 
seem to believe, that Emma's life is ruined by novel-reading alone, as if there 
were no other influences moving her toward catastrophe. He sees clearly the 
general vanity of human beings and the bottomless vapidity of French 
bourgeois society. At the same time, however, Flaubert takes narrative 
modeling as crucially important in Emma's development, for he not only 
describes in great detail the models that Emma reacts to with such depth of 
feeling, but deliberately recalls to the reader's mind the relevance of these 
models at each of the important turning points in Emma's story. 
Part of Emma Bovary's problem is temperamental. She was, Flaubert's 
narrator tells us, "of a temperament more sentimental than artistic" (26), a 
person who "loved the sea only for the sake of its storms, and the green only 
when it was scattered among ruins" (25-26). On the other hand, the content 
of her religious education at the convent school-dominated by "compari-
sons of betrothed, husband, celestial lover, and eternal marriage" (25)-
conditions Emma's susceptibility to the role oflovers in novels and shows her 
how to attach to them a kind of mystical importance. Emma receives the 
contraband novels from 
an old maid who came [to the convent school] for a week each 
month to mend the linen .... She told stories, gave the girls news, 
ran their errands in the town, and on the sly lent the big girls 
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some of the novels, that she always carried in the pockets of her 
apron. . . . They were all about love, lovers, sweethearts, 
persecuted ladies fainting in lonely pavilions, postilions killed at 
every relay, horses ridden to death on every page, somber forests, 
heart-aches, vows, sobs, tears and kisses, little boat rides by 
moonlight, nightingales in shady groves, gentlemen brave as 
lions, gentle as lambs, virtuous as no one ever was, always well 
dressed, and weeping like fountains .... Illustrations in keepsake 
books showed such scenes as a young man in a short cloak, 
holding in his arms a young girl in a white dress who was wearing 
an alms-bag at her belt; or there were nameless portraits of 
English ladies with fair curls, who looked at you from under their 
round straw hats with their large clear eyes .... Others, dreaming 
on sofas with an open letter, gazed at the moon through a slightly 
open window half draped by a black curtain. The innocent ones, 
a tear on their cheeks, were kissing doves through the bars of a 
Gothic cage. (26-27) 
I have omitted a good portion of this passage, but there remains a great 
wealth of concrete detail to feed the imagination of the fifteen-year-old 
Emma looking for role models to show her the behaviors-the facial 
expressions, the attitudes, the gestures, the postures, the dresses and hats 
and how to wear them-that promise the reader a life of whirlwind 
excitement, exquisite sensibility, and thunderous passion. That all these 
images are saccharine, sentimental(ized), and shallow only reinforces 
Flaubert's underlying assumption even more powerfully, the assumption that 
any of us, not just Emma, will take what role models we can get when we need them. 
In order to come into our humanity, in order to take a place in society and 
to be recognized as a person, we know that we must assume roles and we look 
for models to show us what those roles look like and how to play them. If, 
when we are young, no one shows us models of thoughtfulness or reasonable-
ness or self-control or generosity, we will settle for whatever models we can 
find and never know what we are missing. 
Mter Emma marries and begins to fall into lassitude, she turns again to 
romantic narratives: 
She subscribed to "La Corbeille," a ladies' magazine .... In 
Eugene Sue she studied descriptions of furniture; she read 
Balzac and George Sand, seeking in them imaginary satisfaction 
for her own desires. She even brought her book to the table, and 
turned over the pages while Charles ate and talked to her .... At 
other times, she told him what she had been reading, some 
passage in a novel, a new play, or an anecdote from high society 
found in a newspaper story. (41-44) 
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Much later, when Emma and Leon are in the first stages oflust that will lead 
to their eventual affair, Emma counters Leon's preference for poetry over 
novels with the assertion that "in the long-run, [poetry] is tiring .... I have 
come to love stories that rush breathlessly along, that frighten one. I detest 
commonplace heroes and moderate feelings, as one finds them in nature" 
(59). When she finally does consummate her affair, Emma is ecstatic, and the 
fulfillment for her is largely a function of the expectations about life and 
passion that she derived from narrative role models. In her imagination, she 
melts into the daydreams of these narratives as ifher life were written by them 
rather than by the forces of her own circumstances and character. In a sense, 
of course, her life is being written by narratives. To the extent that she 
subscribes to their role modeling, the shape and quality of these narratives 
are the shape and quality of her life. Here is Emma at the beginning of her 
first affair: 
She repeated: "I have a lover! a lover!" delighting at the idea 
[that] ... at last she was to know those joys oflove, that fever of 
happiness of which she had despaired! ... Then she recalled the 
heroines of the books that she had read, and the lyric legion of these 
adulterous women began to sing in her memory with the voice of sisters 
that charmed her. She became herself, as it were, an actual part of these 
lyrical imaginings; at long last, as she saw herself among these 
lovers she had so envied, she fulfilled the love-dream of her 
youth. (117; emphasis added) 
In fashioning her end, of course, Emma dramatizes herselfin a manner 
supremely-and terminally-imitative of cheap-novel heroines. She takes 
poison, eating it "greedily," after which she goes home "with something of 
the serenity of one that has done his duty" (229). Despite the anguish caused 
by the slow-acting poison, Emma approaches the end of her life in the same 
manner she has lived it, not because she has thought through the terms on 
which she desires to end her existence by comparing one set of terms to 
another or by considering her obligations as a parent and spouse, but simply 
because she seems to have no other models in her head of how to have any 
kind of experience except by imitating those represented gestures of the 
narrative queens on whom she modeled herself in her girlhood, in her 
marriage, and in her illicit romances. These models have been her only 
intimate life-long companions, in the sense of companions with whom she 
held daily counsel in the inner recesses of her heart. Only a few hours before 
her death, she continues to dramatize herself as a romantic heroine in a 
novel: "[A] twilight dimness was settling upon her thoughts, and, of all 
earthly noises, Emma heard none butthe intermittent lamentations of this 
poor heart, sweet and remote like the echo of a symphony dying away" (232). 
22 
Critic 63.2 
That Emma's narrative models have led her to nothing but frustration, 
disappointment, and eventually a ghastly death does not mean that she 
abandons these models, nor does her refusal to abandon them mean that she 
is stupid or that she intends to be blatantly self-destructive. For that matter, 
Francesca and Paolo don't intend to be unfaithful, Criseyde doesn't intend 
to fall in love, and Manfred doesn't intend to see all his powers brought to 
nothing by an early death. These fictional characters, like all of us, intend 
to live life finely and fully, but they are influenced far more than they realize 
by the narrative models they take in-as are we all. 
In reallife, we gradually develop a theory oflife, a set of guiding notions 
of why and how to live out our days. Some of us construct our theories with 
more or less conscious deliberation and thoughtful care than others do, but 
none of us goes through life without using role models, some of them from 
narrative as well as from real life, and all of us are affected by the models we 
choose. As children, we tie towels around our necks so we can be as powerful 
as Superman; as adults, we get better at disguising our imitation or at 
pretending that it's not really important to us. Instead of Superman capes, 
we select our conference wear with care: silk ties that connote our sophisti-
cated taste or heavy-duty work shirts to connote our populist sympathies or 
"power suits" that connote our aggressive professionalism. We do all of this 
with deft nonchalance, with more or less conscious awareness. In our 
classrooms, the teaching models provided by Mr. Chips, Mr. Gradgrind, 
Jean Brodie, the Clerk of Oxen ford, or our favorite college or grad-school 
teacher hover over our pedagogy like ghosts. Regardless of the kinds of 
models we encounter, however, we cannot help but be influenced, for good 
or ill, by those we have taken into our hearts. Imitation, as Aristotle long ago 
suggested, is a principal mechanism of both learning and becoming social, 
and our urge to join the continent of humanity , to bridge the gulfbetween 
Arnold's individual islands, will keep us returning again and again to role 
models from narratives that show us not only what we might live for but who 
we might become. 
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